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John C. Rule (1929-2013) was a respected Canadian early modern historian, with a predilection for the 
French foreign office at the end of the Grand Siècle (1638-1715)1. Rule worked with inter alia Ragnhild 
Hatton (1913-1995), iconic professor of diplomatic history at the London School of Economics2. The author 
expired before the manuscript was finished, but invited his former doctoral student Ben S. Trotter to finish 
the work and publish the monograph. A World of Paper constitutes the culmination of the author’s career-
long interest in Jean-Baptiste Colbert de Torcy (1665-1746), nephew of Louis XIV’s most famous controller-
general of finances, but foremost renowned for his unequalled mastery of diplomacy.  
Rule’s approach situates the impressive activity of the bureaux des affaires étrangères3, Torcy’s 
administration, in the general historical sociology of bureaucracy, linking his findings to the theories of 
Max Weber or Peter Burke4. In contrast to earlier works, Rule combines both a more conceptual approach, 
linked to social science -of interdisciplinary relevance-, and a synthesis on French diplomacy from the Nine 
Years War (1688-1697)5 to the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714)6. The author clearly frames the 
proceedings of French bureaucrats and diplomats as an information process. For diplomats and 
bureaucrats in the Grand Siècle, letters and memoranda were not seen as ‘proof to be produced when 
verifying a right or a claim’, but ‘instead records of past negotiations to be ransacked for information and 
precedents to be woven into arguments to drive and shape current negotiations.’ (321)  
Rule sees Louis XIV’s state as closer to present-day public administration than the standard 
concept of absolutism would present (4). Bureaucratic process is at the heart of the book, giving ‘insight 
into the early professionalization of what are now commonly called ‘knowledge workers’ (7) or ‘informal 
brain trust’ (170) of experts, scholars and literary figures’ (10).  Rule puts the emphasis on inferior levels, 
such as that of the premiers commis (12)7. He rightly asserts that civil servants in foreign affairs had more 
                                                          
1 John C. BURNHAM, ‘In Memoriam John C. Rule (1929-2013)’, Perspectives on History, March 2013. 
http://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/perspectives-on-history/march-2013/in-memoriam-john-c-
rule. Last accessed 17 March 2015.  
2 John C. RULE, ‘Colbert de Torcy, an emergent bureaucracy and the formulation of the French Foreign Policy 
(1689-1715)’, in: Ragnhild HATTON (ed.), Louis XIV and Europe, London, Macmillan, 1976, 261-288. 
3 Jean BAILLOU (dir)., Les Affaires étrangères et le corps diplomatique français; 1: de l'Ancien régime au Second 
Empire, Paris, CNRS, 1984, 841 p. (Histoire de l'administration française) 
4 See also Roland MOUSNIER, Les institutions de la France sous la monarchie absolue : 1598-1789, Paris, PUF, 
2005, 1253 p.  (Quadrige. Manuels, Histoire) ; Wolfgang REINHARD, Geschichte der Staatsgewalt : eine vergleichende 
Verfassungsgeschichte Europas von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart, München, Beck, 1999, 631 p.; Raoul Charles 
VAN CAENEGEM, Over koningen en bureaucraten: oorsprong en ontwikkeling van de hedendaagse staatsinstellingen, 
Amsterdam, Elsevier, 1977, 383 p. (Elseviers historische bibliotheek) 
5 Heinz DUCHHARDT, Matthias SCHNETTGER and Martin VOGT (Hrsg.), Der Friede von Rijswijk 1697, Mainz, von 
Zabern, 1998, VIII + 340 p. (Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für europäische Geschichte Mainz. Abteilung 
Universalgeschichte) 
6 Lucien BELY, Espions et ambassadeurs au temps de Louis XIV, Paris, Fayard, 1990, 905 p. 
7 Camille PICCIONI, Les Premiers commis des Affaires étrangères au XVIIe et au XVIIIe siècle, Paris, de Boccard, 
1928, 282 p. ; Jean-Pierre SAMOYAULT, Les bureaux du secrétariat d'État des Affaires étrangères sous Louis XV, Paris,  
Pedone, 1971, 359 p. (Bibliothèque de la Revue d'histoire diplomatique) 
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freedom to act by the nature of things. Diplomatic correspondence contained ‘indeterminate’ responses, 
and, thus ‘involved greater judgment’ than in domestic matters (192). Information-gathering, or 
diplomacy-as-process, is central, rather than negotiations, or the outcomes of diplomacy. Links with spies 
(294) or financial milieus feeding the ‘king’s military-industrial complex’ (10)8 allow to transcend a mere 
formal analysis, and to assert the specific contribution of Torcy’s men to eighteenth-century diplomatic 
culture  (16)9. 
Louis XIV’s bureaucracy is conceptualised in the context of shifting popular loyalty. Hierarchical 
loyalties were not any longer the product of medieval contract thinking, but rather of impersonal service 
to the State, symbolized by the person of the monarch (19)10. Versailles should not be seen as a marvel to 
entertain nobles, but as a genuine ‘great market place’, where elites ‘jockeyed for the privileges, offices, 
and other rewards distributed by the king and his ministers’ (39)11. Paradoxically, loyalty to the monarch 
did not express adherence to a ‘patrimonial system’, but prepared the transition to a pure ‘bureaucratic 
system’ (22), aiming at fixed areas of competence per administration, formal hierarchies, formal training 
and testing of civil servants, full-time officials and a mass of written orders.  
French foreign policy is situated in the pervasive Ancien Régime political culture of kinship, 
patronage12 and bribery13. In an age where ‘self-made men’ were highly suspect, Rule forces the reader to 
think in terms of clans and lineages (226) and, displaying erudition accumulated in a whole career, delivers 
a tentative prosopography of all department staff related to the minister’s family or political network. It is 
no coincidence if Jean Racine named his son ‘Jean-Baptiste’, after Torcy’s uncle, and if the minister 
employed him in his turn in the bureaux (251). Torcy even managed to have his cousin Desmaretz 
appointed as controller-general in 1708 (419).  
‘At least 80 per cent’ of Torcy’s recurrent work on most weekdays consisted of reading out 
dispatches to Louis XIV or the other members of the Conseil d’en haut (380). The minister above all advised 
pragmatic solutions in big power politics, as in the case of the 1710-1711 talks with Britain on ending the 
War of the Spanish Succession (381). In court politics, Torcy was a notorious Gallican, defender of the 
French Church’s independence (74), not a minor detail in relations with the Holy See or in the light of the 
Unigenitus-controversy. As Secretary of State for foreign affairs, Torcy supervised the nomination of 
bishops in Rome or inspections of religious houses in Paris by the Parliament (383). When Clement XI 
                                                          
8 Guy ROWLANDS, The financial decline of a great power : war, influence, and money in Louis XIV's France, 
Oxford, OUP, 2012, XVII + 267 p. 
9 Frederik DHONDT, “La culture juridique pratique au Congrès de Cambrai (1722-1725)”, Revue d’histoire 
diplomatique CXXVII (2013), No. 3, 271-292. 
10 Joël CORNETTE, Le roi de guerre. Essai sur la souveraineté dans la France du Grand Siècle, Paris, Payot, 1993, 
448 p. Nuancing this thesis : Guy ROWLANDS, The dynastic state and the army under Louis XIV : royal service and private 
interest, 1661-1701, Cambridge : CUP, 2002, XXI + 404 p (Cambridge studies in early modern history). 
11 See Mathieu DA VINHA, Les valets de chambre de Louis XIV, Paris, Perrin, 2009, 668 p. ; Jeroen DUINDAM, 
Vienna and Versailles: The Courts of Europe's Dynastic Rivals, 1550-1780, Cambridge, CUP, 2003, XI + 349 p. (New 
Studies in European History); Emmanuel LE ROY LADURIE, Saint-Simon ou le système de la Cour, Paris, Fayard, 1997, 635 
p. 
12 Peter R. CAMPBELL, Power and politics in Old Regime France, 1720-1745, London, Routledge, 1996, XII + 
420 p. 
13 E.g. 114 on bribery at the 1697 Polish Diet in support of the Prince of Conti, French prince of the blood. 
3 
 
(1649-1721), hard pressed by the bullying emperor Joseph I (1678-1711), decided to revaluate the papal 
currency in order to boost his revenue in administrative payments due for episcopal appointments, Torcy 
refused to compensate the Holy See (383).   
Torcy’s long relationship with Louis XIV offers a privileged perspective to draw a portrait of the 
monarch. Rule underlines that the king never forgot to remind Torcy of the difference in social status and 
power between them: the minister was sometimes left out of audiences with foreign envoys, a treatment 
‘intended to show Louis’s superiority, keep his foreign minister humble, or take out his anger on him 
(presumably because of his more even temper) for his weariness with having to woo (“faire la cour”) his 
other ministers’ (378). 
Member of the Colbert-dynasty, the young Torcy was prepared by his father and his father-in-law 
Simon Arnauld de Pomponne (1618-1699), Secretary of State from 1671 to 1679 and member of the 
Conseil until his death. Torcy obtained a doctorate in theology at the Sorbonne in 1680, catalogued the 
books of his father, Charles Colbert de Croissy (1625-1696) and took the oath as avocat in September 1683 
(51). To the astonishment of foreign observers, both Torcy and the marquis of Barbezieux (1668-1701, 
scion of the Le Tellier-dynasty) were both under thirty during the Nine Years War (133).  The young minister 
had a significant part in the French schemes of partition of the Spanish succession14. Abandoning the 
monarch’s ‘legal rights’ (95) to the Spanish throne was the only way to arrive at a structurally stable 
European state system. Surprisingly, Rule does not see the consensual discourse that brought the king to 
this renunciation, as an expression of legal argumentation15.  
Managing foreign policy required control of all potentially damaging information flows, including 
the most private. Elisabeth Charlotte of the Palatinate (1652-1722), Monsieur’s second wife, whose 
indiscreet correspondence often thwarted official diplomacy16, loathed Torcy as a ‘toad’ and compared 
him to ‘stinking eggs and rotten butter […] better off on the gallows than at the court’ (137). In fact, the 
subject of Madame’s reproaches had a blacklist of suspect persons at court, whose correspondence had 
to be gone through personally. Torcy’s fanatic supervision brought Madame de Maintenon, Louis XIV’s 
morganatic wife, to insert insults in her letters, well knowing the minister would read them personally 
(388). Finally, conduct of foreign policy did not only consist of negotiations and information gathering. The 
minister actively pursued a policy of propaganda to convince European public opinion17 of Louis’s 
motives18. 
                                                          
14 Arsène LEGRELLE, La diplomatie française et la Succession d’Espagne, 1659-1725, Paris, Pichon, 1888-1892, 
4 vols. 
15 E.g. 122: ‘for the higher good of European peace, regardless of legal rights to Spain’. 
16 Dirk VAN DER CRUYSSE, Madame palatine: princesse européenne, Paris, Fayard, 1988, 748 p. 
17 E.g. the availability of the Gazette d’Amsterdam from 1691 on. 
18 Joseph KLAITS, Printed propaganda under Louis XIV: absolute monarchy and public opinion, Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1994, XI + 341 p.; Markus BAUMANNS, Das publizistische Werk des kaiserlichen Diplomaten 
Franz Paul Freiherr von Lisola (1613-1674), Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1994, 418 p. (Historische Forschungen, 53) 
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Torcy’s administration controlled domestic généralités19 and the regional courts of law 
(Parlements, 146)20. The Secretary of State ruthlessly managed interior affairs and did not refrain from 
tougher means to assert royal power against local revolts21 or heresy, inflexibly suppressing Protestantism 
(445). His staunch Gallicanism and application of the Edict of Fontainebleau (1685) should not obscure the 
hierarchy in Torcy’s priorities: he strictly guarded the boundaries between secular and ecclesiastical 
matters, rolling back episcopal usurpations of royal power (449). No less than 39 bishops resorted under 
the secretary (447). 
The inevitable blurred lines between warfare and foreign policy gave rise to competition and 
jealousy (23)22. In December 1710, during the darkest days of the conflict on the Spanish Succession, the 
French victory at Brihuega and Villaviciosa was announced first by Torcy, and not by the War Secretary, 
thanks to the superior organisation of his information network (214)23. Rule thinks these situations of 
‘confusion’ or ‘overlap’ are rather eternal and universal (31). At the internal level, the secretary of state 
had to collaborate with both the controller-general of finances and the chancellor, both of whom had 
competing information networks at their disposal, covering the whole of France (13). Torcy claimed 
contentious cases before provincial law courts as dependent of his own competence (442) and issued 
decisions of justice himself24, often in ‘an abundance of mundane domestic business’, quite remote from 
top-level diplomatic negotiations (459).  If necessary, Torcy spied on local officials.  
 Rule rightfully argues secretaries of state had a more active role than the mere executing of the 
royal will would suggest (141). Their offices interpreted norms and applied them to specific cases, on the 
basis of their accumulated practical experience and judicious use of precedent. The author stresses the 
importance of foreign languages, and, most of all, Latin, which still dominated legal exchanges in the Holy 
Roman Empire and was privileged for the authentic versions of treaty texts (58). University training was 
short and of mediocre quality (64), which implied that most civil servants had to be trained on the job and 
acquire knowledge through experience. The premiers commis and technical experts used by Torcy were 
often respected members of literary societies or the Académie Française (193). The minister himself 
leaned on abbots Renaudot (1646-1720) and Dubos (1670-1742) or Nicolas Clément (1647-1712), head of 
the Royal Library.  This network procured him inter alia the writings of Davenant (1656-1714) and Locke 
(218). Within a week after publication in London, Daniel Defoe (1660-1731)’s writings were translated into 
the minister’s collection (336).  
                                                          
19 Provence, Dauphiné, Lyonnais, Champagne, Berry, Limousin, Saintonge, Angoumois, Bearn, Navarre, 
Bigorre, Nébouzan, Bretagne (143). 
20 Torcy had a special adviser for these matters, Michel Sermenté, avocat at the Parliament of Paris (279). 
21 E.g. the anecdote on Michel Bégon, intendant of the La Rochelle generality, who was sent a packet of 
blanco lettres de cachet in April 1694, to arrive at a quick suppression of a peasant uprising (441). 
22 E.g. Villars’s complaint that Torcy was writing to his lieutenants-general, bypassing his competence as 
governor of Provence, 444. 
23 A similar point is made on page 416, concerning the parallel negotiations going on in Holland (1707-1708), 
but the author fails to add the necessary emphasis. 
24 E.g. issuing a lettre de cachet against a widow for scandalous behaviour, at her relatives’ request. 
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Torcy exhorted his diplomats to acquire a historical perspective on international relations and 
negotiations (320) and founded an Académie Politique himself25. He was at the basis of the French 
diplomatic archives, pursuing an unfruitful effort undertaken by his father in 1681. Clément was asked to 
acquire the basic tools for keeping documents: tables for volumes and extracts of correspondence, 
structuring a mountain of paper for later use26. Very interestingly, Rule notes that Torcy cut off living 
thearchives using the Peace of Rijswijk (1697) as a watershed (329). Papers dating after 1697 were kept in 
Versailles. From late 1709 on, the minister could store his archives in the Louvre, in the heart of ‘Paris, the 
information capital’ (328). Torcy’s initiative marked an effective watershed: only since the reign of Louis 
XIV were civil servants’ papers automatically part of public records. The bureaux’s collections were 
regularly expanded, e.g. when archivist Nicolas-Louis Le Dran (1687-1774) bought up Cardinal Mazarin’s 
papers in 1732 (333). 
It is hard to discard the impression that the book was completed rather quickly. On the one hand, 
many theoretical assumptions are insufficiently applied in the more elaborate material chapters (e.g. the 
story of wartime negotiations, 1705-1710, pages 406-42827), or, on the other hand, superfluous28. Some 
assertions, conversely, would have deserved more elaboration, e.g. the statement on page 439, according 
to which the arrival of Louis de Pontchartrain (1643-1727) as chancellor (1690) inaugurated a shift from a 
more ‘judicial-based’ style to a more bureaucratic approach, ‘animated less by men of judicial background, 
but increasingly, especially at the bureau level, by functionaries trained in administrative procedures’, or 
the subsequent affirmation of increasing state intrusion after 1690 (440), inter alia by imposing solutions 
from Versailles, rather than allowing local courts to decide quarrels (452). Would this amount to royal 
disregard for ‘law’ in general, as the author suggests, or, quite the contrary, to the autonomous use of 
public law for administrative purposes, to the detriment of private law-based argumentation29 ?  
                                                          
25 Remarkably, this initiative is treated rather quickly (366-367). See Guy Thuillier, La première École 
d'Administration. L'Académie politique de Louis XIV, Genève, Droz, 1996, XVI + 200 p.  (Hautes études médiévales et 
modernes, 75) 
26 A method similar to that of early treaty compilers, whose works would become standard references in 
negotiations, see Georg Friedrich VON MARTENS, “Discours Préliminaire. Sur les différents recueils de traités publiés 
jusqu'à ce jour”, in: Georg Friedrich VON MARTENS, Supplément au Recueil des principaux traités, Göttingen, Dieterich, 
1802, vol. 1, iii-lxxii. 
27 This part mainly suffers from a lack of recalling military events which structured the talks, and does not 
add new information compared to Lucien Bély’s work, or that of Geertruida Stork-Penning (Het grote werk: 
vredesonderhandelingen gedurende de Spaanse successie-oorlog 1705-1710, Groningen, Wolters, 1958, (Historische 
Studies; 12)), who links up better with internal political divisions. Rule is caught in the conundrum of his book, in the 
sense that his theoretical path-dependency is unsustainable, causing anecdotic digressions. The latter, however, are 
often incomplete and hard to understand without knowledge of supplementary contextual factors.  
28 E.g. Mentioning ‘Contingency theory’ to state that ‘the department’s bureaus emerged as fluid and 
pragmatic arrangements matching available individuals to the tasks at hand’, or the use of the term ‘non-state actor’. 
29 Albert RIGAUDIERE, Histoire du droit et des institutions dans la france médiévale et moderne, Paris, 
Economica, 2010, 893 p. (Corpus Histoire du droit); Martin LOUGHLIN, Foundations of public law, Oxford/New York, 
OUP, 2010, XII + 515 p. 
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The Regency following Louis XIV’s decease is only portrayed in general terms, often based on older 
literature, leading incidentally to factually erroneous assertions30. Stressing Torcy’s continuing importance 
as postmaster-general and the enduring resilience of his personal network (211) is of course entirely 
justified31. The suggestion of a power shift from the formally competent Conseil des affaires étrangères in 
the Polysynody-system32 to the premiers commis is equally plausible (149)33.  
 Minor flaws do not prevent that the richness of anecdotes and revealing thick descriptions, based 
on primary archival sources, are a great addition to our knowledge of the louisquatorzian system. Rule 
emphasises the central part played by loyalty to the State. This should count as a warning to historians 
eager to over-emphasise religious or ideological motives. On page 92, elaborating ‘Torcy’s Preparation for 
and Rise to Power’, Rule describes a discussion in the Conseil d’en haut, reported in the minister’s Journal. 
The dukes of Burgundy (eldest grandson of Louis XIV and prospective heir, 1682-1712) and Beauvillier 
(1648-1714, member of the ‘clan des dévôts’) urged the French king to abstain from deals with the 
Ottoman sultan. Torcy, by contrast, considered their obsession with a clear conscience ridiculous and 
pathetic with respect to the far more serious issue of the ongoing War of the Spanish Succession. The 
minister did not share Louis’s solidarity with the chased Catholic king of England, James II (1633-1701). 
The latter’s supporters insatiably leaked information,  clumsily executed plans for invasions or revolts, and 
were useless as allies (400). This adds credibility to the French thesis that recognition of James ‘III’ (1688-
1766) as his father’s son in the society of princes did not amount to a recognition of his internal sovereignty 
in Britain34, but served merely aulic purposes.  
Rule’s work will become indispensable for any researcher or student interested in both the 
conduct of foreign affairs and public administration in Old Regime France. This overview has the colossal 
merit of adding a thick description of the period 1688-1715 to already considerable previous literature35. 
Situating the bureaux’s action in a broader spectrum, encompassing relations with the papacy, internal 
administration and information gathering for a wide array of purposes, is a revealing and valuable asset. 
                                                          
30 E.g. Franco-British reconciliation in 1718 (126), whereas it had already set in by late 1716 (Frederik DHONDT, 
Balance of Power and Norm Hierarchy. Franco-British Diplomacy after the Peace of Utrecht, Leiden/Boston: Martinus 
Njihoff/Brill, 2015, 72-105 (Legal History Library, 17; Studies in the History of International Law, 7)). 
31 Torcy was forced to resign as postmaster-general on 21 October 1721, to the benefit of Cardinal Guillaume 
Dubois, the Regent’s main minister (DHONDT, Balance of Power, 247). 
32 Charles-Irénée CHASTEL DE SAINT-PIERRE, Discours sur la polysynodie, Londres, J. Tosson, 1718, VII + 129 p. ; 
Alexandre DUPILET, La Régence absolue : Philippe d’Orléans et la polysynodie, Seyssel, Champ Vallon, 2011, 436 p.  
(Époques) 
33 Rule asserts that Antoine Pecquet sr. (1666-1728), the most influential advisor of the Regency, limited the 
Council’s meetings to twice a week in the Louvre, delegating consistent parts of diplomatic correspondence to the 
bureaux. 
34 E.g. Gaspard DE REAL DE CURBAN, La science du gouvernement, Paris, Les libraires associés, 1764, t. 5, 93-94. 
35 E.g. Guido BRAUN, La connaissance du Saint-Empire en France 1643-1756, Paris, Oldenbourg, 2010, 911 
p.  (Pariser Historische Studien, 91); Jean-Philippe CENAT, Chamlay, le stratège secret de Louis XIV, Paris, Belin, 2011, 
203 p. ; Charles FROSTIN, Les Pontchartrain, ministres de Louis XIV : alliances et réseau d'influence sous l'Ancien Régime, 
Rennes, PUR, 2006, 597 p. (Histoire) ; Emmanuel PENICAUT, Faveur et pouvoir au tournant du grand siècle, Michel 
Chamillart : Ministre et secrétaire d’état de la guerre de Louis XIV, Paris, École des Chartes, 2004, X + 518 p. (Mémoires 
et documents de l’École des Chartes) ; Jean-Claude WAQUET, François de Callières : l’art de négocier en France sous 
Louis XIV, paris, Éd. Rue d’Ulm, 2005, 288 p. 
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Rule’s book brings early modern bureaucracy to life, starting from numerous but often only partially 
conserved records36. This synthesis displays all available information, from organisational charts (196), 
maps (186), ceremony at ambassadors’ audiences at Versailles (356-358) or in Torcy’s private home in the 
Rue Vivienne in Paris (359), to the physical arrangement of council meetings (379) and the detailed account 
of a department head’s day in office (440). 
Frederik Dhondt (Postdoctoral Research Fellow of the Research Foundation Flanders (FWO), Legal History 
Institute/UGent) 
                                                          
36 E.g. graphs of monthly payments for the year 1714, 284-285; no names of commis mentioned in the 
accounts, only of their supervisors (310-311). 
